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Abstract
We show how to restructure the counterparty risk faced by the originator of a securitization
or covered bond arising from an interest rate hedging swap assisted by a “one-way” collateral
agreement. This risk emerges when the swap is negotiated between the special purpose vehicle
and a third party that covers itself through a back-to-back swap with the originator. We show
that the counterparty risk of the originator may be removed by adding a chain of back-to-back
credit derivatives between the three parties (originator, counterparty and vehicle).
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1 Summary
As a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) issues a securitization, it has to enter into a hedging inter-
est rate swap (a basis swap) that transforms the interest payments coming from the collateral
assets into the coupons of the issued note. When such a derivative is traded with a third party
(different from the original owner of the collateral assets, i.e. the originator), the latter usually
enters into a back-to-back swap with the originator, and both trades are supported by “one way”
CSAs that, on one hand do not require cash collateral from the SPV, but on the other hand do
not protect the originator from the default of its counterparty [3]. The counterparty risk faced
by the originator can therefore be quite large, taking into account the typically large notional
∗This paper reflects the authors’ opinions and not necessarily those of their employers.
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of such deals and their long maturity. All of the above also apply to the case of a covered bond,
and it is well known that the long term transactions assisted by asymmetric collateralization
agreements imply a considerable impact in term of capital charge for the unhedged party, espe-
cially under the new Basel III framework coming in force [1], [2]. In the last years, the European
financial institutions have made large use of securitizations and covered bond to improve their
liquidity, and the deterioration of the credit quality of many originators forced the recourse to
third parties with better rating as swap counterparties, in order to mantain high rating grades
for the SPVs.
In the following we propose a stylized securitization structure that eliminates such counter-
party risk even if it still does not require any collateral to be posted to the originator. With
minor changes it is applicable also to the case of a covered bond. It consists in a set of credit
derivatives transactions replicating a three party agreement (TPA) between originator, SPV and
swap counterparty that is fair for all parties and that prevents any liquidity shock that may arise
following the default of the swap counterparty. Even if the TPA itself would represent a financial
hedge of the counterparty risk, the set of credit derivatives seems to us a financial equivalent
but more robust structuring under the bankruptcy law. We will show that it represents an ef-
fective restructuring of the one-way counterparty risk linked to the securitization/covered bond
structure, therefore permitting a considerable capital relief.
2 Swap’s counterparty default in the usual structure
We examine the case in which a Counterparty (C) enters into a hedging swap (the Front Swap)
with the SPV (V), the issuer of the Note, and hedges its position with a back-to-back swap
(the Back Swap) with the Originator (O). Both trades are supported by independent ISDA
agreements with “one-way” CSA.
Figure 1: The swap hedging the interest rate risk of the SPV (Front Swap) and its back-to-back
transaction (Back Swap).
Neglecting the fees paid running to C by O, we describe a stylized version of the structure.
In the Front Swap V pays to C the interest proceedings from the securitized assets, and C pays
to V the coupons of the Note (see Figure 1). Correspondingly, in the Back Swap C pays back to
O the interest proceedings, and receives the coupons of the Note. These two contract are set up
only in order to hedge the interest rate risk of the SPV, that otherwise would face a potential
liquidity mismatch. To guarantee the patrimonial segregation of the SPV, the ISDA agreement
and CSA between C and O and those between C and V are distinct, and the CSAs have a
threshold structure that is constructed in such a way as to prevent V from posting any collateral
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to C and correspondingly to prevent C from posting collateral to O (the “one-way” CSA men-
tioned above). The reason for this is that, typically, the SPV has a small liquidity buffer that
might be insufficient to post the required collateral to C, but the high creditworthiness of the
former makes the risk acceptable for the latter, even in absence of collateralization. However,
in order to minimize the cost of the transaction to O, C will not be required to post collateral
to O either. For the sake of simplicity we will assume henceforth that the CSAs guarantee a
perfect counterparty risk1 hedge in case the collateral has to be posted by O to C and by C to V.
Rating agencies require a high credit standing for the swap counterparty C, but its default
probability can be significantly different from zero. This generates counterparty risk for O, tak-
ing into account the fact that the Back Swap can take large mark-to-market values, given the
large notionals that are typical for this kind of transactions. The consequences of this affect
both capital requirements through the risk weighted asset (RWA) related to the exposure to
the counterparty C, and the P&L statement through the expected loss (CVA) related to such
exposure. Moreover, the Basel III framework has introduced additional capital requirements
related to the variability of this component, the so-called CVA risk.
In the following we will examine (in a stylized way) the economic consequences of the de-
fault of C both when the mark-to-market of the Back Swap is negative for O, and when it is
positive. In the first case, assuming as before perfect hedge of counterparty risk via the CSA,
the collateral posted by O to C and by C to V equals the mark-to-market of the Front Swap as
seen by V, which amounts to the opposite of the mark-to-market of the Back Swap as seen by
O. Therefore, the Termination Amounts as defined in the ISDA agreement for the Originator
and the SPV are both zero. Moreover, if we assume that the replacement transactions are put
in place instantaneously, neither O nor V will experience a liquidity shock, since on one hand O
will replace the liquidity posted to C with the upfront of the Replacement Transaction, and on
the other hand V will pay as upfront the collateral posted by C to the new counterparty (see
Figure 3).
Figure 2: The one-way mechanism. Each arrow indicates the party for which the mark-to-
market is positive and to which the collateral is posted. Here the mark-to-market of the Back
Swap is negative for O, and the collateral is posted as usual. Under the assumption of perfect
collateralization, no losses are suffered by the parties if C defaults.
In case of default of C when the mark-to-market of the Back Swap is positive for O, the
latter suffers a loss that amounts to a fraction (so-called “loss given default”, LGD) of the
1 i.e. no gap risk, and continuous collateralization with zero threshold and minimum transfer amount
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mark-to-market, while the SPV does not experience any loss, nor any liquidity shock, since the
Termination Amount now is paid by V to C, but is received by V from the new counterparty as
the upfront of the Replacement Transaction.
Figure 3: The one-way mechanism. Each arrow indicates the party for which the mark-to-market
is positive. Here the mark-to-market of the Back Swap is positive and no collateral is posted.
If C defaults, V terminates the swap without losses, but O suffers a loss of LGD·mtm.
3 A TPA as a hedge of the counterparty risk
As mentioned before, even if the SPV and the Originator belong to the same financial group,
there cannot be netting of the amount due by C to O with that due by V to C in case of default
of C, since the two transactions refer to different ISDA agreements. In the following we will
describe2 an hypothetical three-party-agreement (TPA) that will set the basis for such a netting,
and that introduces an additional ingredient required to ensure fairness for all parties.
The TPA consists of three clauses, that would be activated only in case of default of C and
if the mark-to-market of the Back Swap is positive for O. If such event takes place:
1. O waives such amount in favour of C when it calculates the Termination Amount of the
Back Swap;
2. C waives such amounts in favour of V when it calculates the Termination Amount of the
Front Swap;
3. V pays to O the amount received as upfront from its new counterparty in the Replacement
Transaction.
It is easy to realize that the TPA constitutes a perfect hedge of the counterparty risk for O
in the event that the mark-to-market of the Back Swap is positive, and at the same time it is
fair for each party, and prevents any liquidity shock, in particular for the SPV. Let us point out
that clause (A) together with the ISDA between C and O corresponds to the ISDA 1992 First
Method, and the same is true for clause (B) and the agreement between C and V. However, this
equivalence is no more true when both clauses are considered together. In fact they effectively
implement the netting of the amounts owed by V and due to O. Moreover they are fair for C,
2an agreement containing clauses similar to the subsequent 1. and 2. was in place between Lehman Brothers
SpA and a primary Italian commercial bank, and terminated out-of-money after the default of the former
4
that does not realize any profit or loss from its own default. Clause (C) is required to prevent
the SPV from realizing a profit, and O from posting a loss, and it constitutes a form of netting
between O and V. However it does not affect the solvency of the SPV nor its credit standing.
4 The TPA as a chain of Contingent CDS
Notwithstanding the TPA examined above represents a fair financial hedge to the counterparty
risk of the Originator, we observe that its contractual design might not be considered robust
under some bankruptcy laws principle or interpretation. Indeed the bankruptcy supervisor of
the Counterparty, when addressing the obligation related to the TPA after the default of the
Counterparty, might identify an improper advantage for the Originator with respect to the other
creditors, considering that such advantage is not linked to a payoff of an agreement rather than,
more properly, to a deed of waiver. However, in what follows we illustrate an equivalent struc-
turing realized through standard ISDA credit derivatives, which therefore may be preferrable to
the TPA as more legally robust.
By entering in the usual structure without the TPA introduced above, the counterparty risk
faced by the Originator is equivalent to a short position on an upfront Contingent Credit De-
fault Swap (CCDS), i.e. a CDS whose notional is the mark-to-market (if positive) of a reference
swap at the time of default of a reference entity, and whose premium has to be payed upfront.
More specifically, the Originator gives protection to the Counterparty through a CCDS refer-
enced to the Back Swap and to the Counterparty itself. Incidentally, in the usual structure
showed above, the Counterparty gives protection to the SPV through a CCDS referenced to the
Front Swap and to the SPV itself, but we may consider the CCDS be worth zero i.e. the SPV
non defaultable, and hereafter we focus instead on the defaultability of the Counterparty.
Figure 4: The chain of contingent credit default swaps (CCDS) replicating the TPA. The CCDSs
have the same terms and are referenced to C and the Back Swap; each related arrow indicates
the protection buyer
By entering the TPA, the Originator buys back through the CCDS the protection on the
Counterpartys default from the SPV, which buys it from the Counterparty itself, which hedges
itself with the Originator. In other words, the three parts of the TPA listed above map into
the following set of transactions involving identical CCDS referenced to the Back Swap and the
Counterparty (see Figure 6):
1. C buys protection on itself from O through the CCDS;
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2. V buys protection on C from C through the CCDS;
3. O buys protection on C from V through the CCDS.
Note that all we said above about the TPA remains true in the present setting, and none
of the parties pays any net premium, all being hedged through back-to-back transactions. Note
however that in 2. the SPV buys protection on the Counterparty from the Counterparty itself,
but this issue can be addressed by negotiating the CCDS under the same ISDA agreement to
which the Front Swap is referenced, so that the Front Swap itself fully collateralizes the credit
default swap. Indeed, the ISDA agreement is a netting agreement allowing - in case of default
of the Counterparty - the offset between the payoff of the credit default swap3 and the mark-
to-market of the Front Swap. The former is negative for the SPV when the Back Swaps one is
positive and therefore equal to the payoff of the CCDS; conversely, if the Counterparty defaults
when the mark-to-market of the Front Swap is positive for the SPV, the CCDS expires worthless
and, as a consequence of the perfect collateralization we assumed before, the SPV does not suffer
any loss.
Figure 5: The termination amounts, in case of negative mark-to-market of the Back Swap for
O.
Analogously, also the CCDS in 1. must be negotiated under the same ISDA agreement of
the Back Swap, and if its mark-to-market is positive in case of default of the Counterparty it
collateralizes the payoff of the CCDS, protecting the Counterparty. This resembles the case of
a counterparty buying a CDS from and referenced to another counterparty, collateralized by an
amount equal to the entire notional posted by the latter to the former: for a contingent CDS,
at the time of default the notional is indeed the positive part of the reference swap.
The ideas illustrated so far are ultimately based of the observation that, if a party enters in
a swap with another party, the “unfunded” counterpart of a “funded” asymmetric hedge given
by a “one-way” collateral agreement between such parties, is just a CCDS exchanged between
the parties and referenced to one of them, under the same netting agreement with the reference
swap. In other words the following two may be thought as equivalent (see also [4]):
• A enters in a swap with B, with a “one-way” collateral such that a perfect collateral
is posted from A to B, therefore B is fully hedged by counterparty risk but A remains
unhedged;
3such payoff, triggered by the default of the Counterparty, is defined as the positive part of the reference swap
and, given that its reference name is the Counterparty itself, in the case of transaction 2 it has to be considered
as a Unpaid Amount under the ISDA 1992 definitions
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• A enters in a swap with B, and B buys - from A under the same netting agreement - a
CCDS referenced to the swap and to A.
This example should be considered in analogy with the transaction 2. above (the SPV as A, the
Counterparty as B). A similar argument may be outlined for the transaction 1. We may say
that, instead of restructuring the preexistent “one-way” CSA into an ordinary “two-way” CSA
by adding a second “one-way” CSA on the opposite direction as in the first bullet point above
(not a viable solution, given the liquidity squeeze of the SPV), our proposal makes use of its
“unfunded” counterpart. Finally, a back-to-back strategy is made possible given the peculiar
three-party relationship between the originator, the counterparty and the vehicle.
Figure 6: The termination amounts, in case of positive mark-to-market of the Back Swap for O.
5 Conclusions
When a special purpose vehicle enters in a swap with a counterparty in order to hedge the interest
rate risk related to the issue of a securitization or a covered bond, usually such counterparty
enters in turn in a back-to-back transaction with the originator, generally assisted by a “one-
way” collateral, leaving the originator to face a generally remarkable counterparty risk. We
showed how this risk may be canceled, without paying any premium, by entering in a chain
of contingent credit default swaps (CCDS), at the same time bought and sold by each party,
moving from the basic idea that the effects on the default risk of a counterparty of an asymmetric
collateralized swap may be replicated by a CCDS referenced to and negotiated with the same
counterparty, under the same netting agreement of the swap itself.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Damiano Brigo for helpful discussions and Carlo Palego for encouraging our
research.
References
[1] D. Wood, Dealers face funding time-bomb from one-way CSAs, RISK Magazine, February
2011
[2] D. Wood, The end for one-way CSAs, RISK Magazine, August, 2010
7
[3] D. Wood, Saving structured finance: Dealers vie for SPV replacement swaps, RISK Mag-
azine, November 2012
[4] L. Giada and C. Nordio, Funding Bilateral Valuation Adjustment, working paper, avail-
able at http://www.defaultrisk.com
8
